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Gender is probably an essential organizing principle. It is a truism to say, but still
useful to repeat outside academia, that all human institutions are gendered and
hierarchical. So is the nation, of course, and so is even sex/gender itself. These
two constructed and historical differences (nation, sex/gender) intersect and
mutually support the hierarchy at the heart of each other. But gender has the
peculiarity of being used as an “archetype” for other inequalities and injustices by
analogy, through the fact that women’s subordination is generally and globally
accepted by most. Also, sex/gender is older than nation. Indeed, it presents itself
as apparently ahistoric because it was there before language, as “primordial”. The
global patriarchal consensus regarding the position of women is interesting
because it is universally used for the justification of other subjugations, too, through
a mechanism of symbolic “analogy”. This instrumentalising of a state of affairs (i.e.
of the domination of all women by men), through its depiction as natural, and thus
its naturalization and essentialisation, is itself historical . To introduce, maintain or
promote other inequalities and exclusions (class, racial, caste, national, ethnic,
ideological, etc.), it is useful to project on them the supposed “naturalness” of the
gender inequality, and thus to feminize the weaker term in the dyad. The nation
itself, as the term in Western languages shows candidly, draws its language and
terminology from the historically much older, though also constructed, sexual and
gender difference (nascere, Lat. “to be born”). Coming into language and on the
historic stage much later (from the 15th to the 19 th century), it uses the already
existing language and terminology. This slips further into the language of state-
building and of adjacent areas too.
This unequal relation is also constantly presented as a symmetrical and non-
hierarchal difference. This blurring of the two distinct ways of relating of the two
terms to each other in a binary plays the trick of the hegemony imposed. On one
level, the two (the feminine and the masculine, or any other two terms of a
hierarchical binary) are equivalent or equal: this is the case on the level of the
particular. To be more precise, on this level, they are different and/but equal. Yet
on another level, when it comes to a higher authority or to transcendence, at the
level of the universal, they stand in a hegemonic relationship, because one of the
two terms will be normative, while the other will be marked as different (the
exception). The normative element is the one whose experience can be directly
universalised (as human, for example), and who has a privileged position in
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representation. When the higher office, the “universal” level is taken into account,
the term which is normative and directly “universal”1 appears twice (both as
particular/different and as universal) where the other appears only once (as only
particular & different). That is also how hegemony takes place: far from being one
and the same forever, hegemony is itself only an office, where the particular
interests of one of the participants in the game are successfully universalised for
some time. The constant blurring between the particular and the “universal” levels
is part of the game (Ivekovic, 1981, pp. 5-49; Laclau, 1996).
In the case of the gender-nation relationship, and because the nation uses the
language of obstetrics and of parentage, there is also a signifying and purposeful
confusion as well as a constant questioning regarding the “origin”. This is where
psychoanalysis has introduced the unconscious in its system: it is that which
cannot be remembered, thought or said, since it is the origin of thinking itself.
Language cannot say totality though it strives to, besides being unable to say, at
the other end, that which does not correspond to the norm. The sexual/gender
difference is one of the most difficult things to think, and few philosophers will admit
it as openly as Jean-François Lyotard, for example (Lyotard, 1988, p. 31; my
translation). It is difficult, for two reasons: firstly, because it was there before both
language and life, and language cannot say that which is its condition of existence.
Secondly, (or perhaps both reasons are one and the same), this difference tends to
dualise and gender everything, and may not be neutral in itself.
Thinking (reason), as it arises in language, appears to be already split. Yet the
split of reason is prior to any colonialism, prior to any relationship East-West,
North-South or man-woman, though we tend to see it so, especially today mainly in
the wake of the Cold War divide: but it really marks the beginning of inner
colonisation as the condition for all rapport of inequality. Split reason is what should
warn us against the philosophical institution itself.
Split reason is also what the Buddhists call avidyâ, “ignorance”: the ignorance
we have about the conditions of our origin, in other words –about the sexual
difference and exchange from which we come. Or about the other. To understand
this different treatment by different intellectual (and historic) contexts, we need to
engage in a bit of inter-contextual or inter-cultural translation. Women have not only
been represented as the “other” and identified with other subordinate terms in
dichotomies: the domestic sphere and limited access to the external, public-political
attributed to women historically shows perfectly that forms of modernity and post-
modernity can integrate, build in and even rely upon areas of “pre-modernity” as
constitutive for them. Moreover, there are different types of modernity, depending
on whether the culture in question is a dominant one or not. But at every important
turn, the subordinate relationships (not only those regarding women) are
renegotiated in new terms. The “cultural” translation is thus needed within the
system which is far from monolithic. That “translation” is itself essential for any type
or freedom of justice to be claimed. The positions of men and women not being
symmetrical, justice has to count with the différend, which is really what the French
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clean.
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call, more generally, the political. And that requires that we assume a constant
process of translation, including translation within one and the same language,
system of signs or meaning: that we put ourselves at risk, i.e. that we put ourselves
into translation. In other words, there is no permanent guarantee for gender
equality, democracy, freedom or justice, but the best guarantee we have for it is
–precisely that there is no guarantee (Ivekovic, 2002, pp. 121-145).
The particular origin of a universal idea doesn’t prevent it from being universally
accepted, though it can’t be by all for the same reasons or in the same way
(indeed, it can also be enforced). Ideas that stand for the universal (such as the
nation, the state) are subject to erosion, especially in our time. If someone wanted
to keep them to last through a transformation (a transition), they would have to be
credited with new concrete arguments linked to real experience. For hegemony,
you need to have support. Those who have abandoned the sinking ship of a
previously recognised universal will pass to some other (particular) interest made
universal, through a political project, through a war, through elections, etc. It is
interesting to analyse what the conditions are, or what it takes for one hegemonic
configuration to crumble. I have analysed in my work mainly the “psycho-political”
conditions in modernity for this (Ivekovic, 1995; 1999; 2001), and I have done this
while keeping in mind that there have been different modes of modernity such as
(at least) capitalist, socialist and colonial/post-colonial modernity. This helps in
avoiding the Cold War notion that colonial or socialist societies have been
something completely different (alterity itself) and that they, or at least some of
them, are pre-modern or “traditional” beyond repair. Modernity itself (re)produces
“tradition”, especially in the third world and in post-colonial and post-socialist
countries again. The opposition pre-modern/modern does not hold, but the fiction is
nevertheless conceptually quite efficient as an organizing principle of (post-
)modernity itself. This may be among other things because it is also highly
gendered, tradition being assigned to women, modernity to men. Modernity and
“pre-modernity” coexist perfectly, and thrive on, pockets of all sorts of ancien
régime, of “tradition”, of pre-industrial production (and social /re/production), both in
the third world, but also within themselves (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Capitalism and
the system of nation-states expand outwards as long and as far as possible, but
they still have resources for an “internal expansion” and an inner colonisation
(Theweleit, 1978/1989). One of the terrains for this is the gender equation –or the
subordination of women: the fact that modern societies, and nowadays post-
modern ones, still rely completely on women’s slavery, bonded labour, women’s
subordination, their “pre-modern” production of housework and social reproduction
incorporated into industrial modern (capitalist) relations as well as into post-modern
new “immaterial” informative working conditions. This is also why significant female
political agency may still make its appearance in the future.
I could observe in my own life experience how the self-representation of a
population was changed and discredited over the years (the former Yugoslavia).
When this gap widens so that no confidence can be put any more into the “higher
authority” which serves also as that what keeps a community together (a
homogenizing principle), it comes to a very dangerous crisis which may, but also
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may not, turn into violence. Depending on the historic conditions, a critical event
(Das, 1995) may or may not occur here. That possible turning point could also be
disintegration. In a situation where one or several generations have been spared
the political, where solutions and answers have been given to them in advance so
that they need not even ask the questions, where people or some portions of it
have been “spared” responsibility and political agency as citizens, violence is
possible, if not probable, at such times. Especially so if institutions have crumbled,
too. And here I quote Radomir Konstantinovic from a very important passage: “The
smaller the feeling of reality, the bigger the necessity for violence” (Konstantinovic,
1981, pp. 87-88).
We all know of such situations in countries where institutions and value
systems have crumbled to pieces while nothing was put together to replace them:
that is the ideal situation for new or old, reformed mafias to step into the picture
and attempt the hegemonic escalation. Sometimes, as was the case in the Balkans
recently, wars are needed for that. And wars are of course more gendered than
anything else. They also represent a particular setback for women, for any peaceful
options, for democracy in general.
But I would like to come back to my own definition of violence -as being the
reaction to the fact that “we” are not self-generated, and being the attempt to
compensate for it via the identity principle (i.e. sameness kept at any cost) and the
struggle for (maintaining) power. At the level of states, this is also called
sovereignty. It enhances a hegemonic mechanism. Historically (but of course, not
fatally), the urge for the continuity of the same as being identical to itself has been
appropriated by representations of masculinity and by men (on another level, by
the West, regarding other continents; or by any dominant agency). There is an
expression in Sanskrit that fits very well here, svayambhû, “being (generated,
produced, or becoming) by oneself”. The nation (also through the name-of-the-
father, where it applies) is one such self-foundation, as well as the family, in
patriarchal conditions, having an exclusively masculine lineage at its basis
(Ivekovic, 1993, pp. 113-126). For that, you need to have split reason.
At the time of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia2, the main parties in the
conflict, from the time their stakes and they themselves were articulated as “ethnic”
or “national”, tried hard to prove that they had been on a given territory not only
before the others, but even completely without the others. No alterity could be
tolerated in their constitution. Since, of course, there is neither biology nor culture
without the other or without difference, the nationalistic dream of self-birth is both
suicidal and murderous. Paradoxically, overdone “identity” leads in the long run to
its own disintegration.
In such a construction, where the national and the masculine are immediately
identified and thought of as universal though in different ways (Theweleit,
1987/1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997), women find themselves in a double-bind situation,
which is a situation of non-agency, of forceful immobilisation. They do not
correspond to the pattern or to the ideal with which to identify in sameness, since
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they embody both the difference and that which is marked as different. In practical
political terms, it means that they are practically (but not theoretically) denied
access to active citizenship, and their having those rights abstractly doesn’t help
here, because they find themselves on the side of the exception to the rule, which
they guarantee precisely by being the exception (Ivekovic, 1993, pp. 113-126). The
same is true of other groups, such as Black Americans, etc. As for patriarchy, it
does not concern particularly women, but the general network of hierarchies.
Sex/gender3 may eventually be only this: a first split in/of thinking, a separation
before it is reflected (upon). In this case, it would all be about a division of reason,
to which corresponds at the same time, in a signifying shift back which makes the
levels (dimensions) change, the division between nature and culture. I use the
French expression partage de la raison because of the ambiguity of the term
partage. Sex/gender is then the crucial argument and instrument of enforcing and
maintaining a form of domination thought to be natural, i.e. the “best”. It is
normative. It is not sure there is such a thing as sex or gender (beyond the
biological) outside its fantasies and its construction which, nevertheless, manages
to produce real cleavages. From the biological sex, which is also accessible only
as informed by culture (which means that it has no “pure” form), to the social and
political gap between men and women, there is indeed a total shift of dimensions.
We are interested in sex/gender as the division of reason, and it is as such that it
enters into the definition of the nation which it maintains and whose hierarchies it
reproduces.
Is there a way of overcoming this cleavage of reason? By overcoming it while
not erasing it through any kind of sexual “communalism”, but through inclusions, in
the manner of a “negativity” that makes the difference, in order to constitute what
Etienne Balibar calls a “citizenship without community” (Balibar, 2001, p. 124)?
Because, he says, it is the institutionalised exclusion that constitutes the founding
moment of citizenship. By extension, it is the exclusion (or rather, the subordinate
inclusion) of women that founds citizenship as well as the nation. And as he rightly
says, in order to overcome compartmentalization, we should have to engage in a
common operation or a shared act (ibid, p. 125). This means that men would also
have to engage on the side of women in an enterprise of democratising gender
relations, in order to inscribe women as equals within the people, into citizenship
and into the “nation”. This project can only be reciprocity, if we don’t mean to
render the nation, in its recognition of (“ethnic”, “national” and other) differences,
paradoxically blind only to the sex/gender difference among all differences. But
since women are seen as the stake and the material basis for the nation, a
supplementary cultural effort is needed for that, in order to brake the “normality”
which is just normativity.
Balibar imagines alternating and reciprocity of the dominant and dominated
positions, in order to fight against totalitarian hegemonies (ibid, p. 213). But such a
“rotative” democracy may still seem too rigid since it is still basically binary. On the
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 I am not going into this terminological distinction which I don’t follow here, but we can discuss it; see
what follows.
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other hand, the specificity of the subordinate inclusion of women, exactly, doesn’t
lend itself to be caught, or be expressed, represented, or for that matter
“universalised”, in a dichotomy. Or does it? The dichotomy, which also supposes a
hierarchy, is the very form of the articulation as well as of the social and political
normalization of the sex and gender relationship. It is the form in which the
subordination of women is imposed and made consensual. The dichotomy
(subject-object, male-female, rationality-nature, etc.) is the way of silencing the real
relationship that can take place between women and men within a more complex
configuration as informed by their real common life which also brings in individual
differences. Normalized reality represents this relationship in a necessarily binary
and inadequate manner, while violating it. For democracy, one has to start from
sex/gender, but not end in it. The sex/gender difference passes through each of us,
and differences are as numerous, and more, indeed, than individuals (since each
one of us can be many). The sex/gender social relationship begins not where there
are two people, but even before. It is impossible to imagine de-communalising
cultural, ethnic, religious, national, racial, class etc., identities, and not do the same
with sexual/gender “identities”, through which communalism/communitarianism
starts also for the other groups.
In the wake of “globalisation”, and beyond the general confusion regarding the
political subject and who should be considered as such, it is generally accepted
that women are or should be subjects, and their political agency, both political and
personal, has, at least theoretically, become systemic, even though more on the
side of movement, of resistance and of marginality. This can be checked from
practically any contemporary philosopher, political or social scientist4. Even without
claiming political subjectivity for women in the rigid, classical sense (as a “molar”
identity, to use a Deleuzeian term), it is clear that women are more than ever
involved in the constituting people (peuple). The problem remains, however, that le
peuple is also split by the same division. It is on the way from constituting (where
they take part and often the initiative) to constituted (established) power that trace
is usually lost of women, even today. In the French meaning of the word, it is then
la politique, the state, the nation, that generally excludes them (except as
exceptions to their gender, of course), while le politique bears testimony, on the
contrary, to the fundamental stake they represent, not only as a powerful, though
“queer”, agency, but also as the symbolically, asymmetrically sub-summed, thereby
confirming the basic split of reason.
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